Existence of God :: Ontological arguments

The predicament of the presence of God has pained humanity for a huge number of years. Numerous rationalists have advanced their hypotheses so as to demonstrate the presence of God. A large portion of these contentions can be named as ontological. These contentions vary from different contentions for the presence of God since they are not founded on experimental information, for example, the presence or nature of the universe, yet are somewhat grounded in unadulterated rationale. First we will consider the contentions introduced by Anselm. He accepted that God is ‘that than which nothing more noteworthy can be conceived’; on the off chance that one get this, at that point God exists in his psyche; however it is more prominent to exist as a general rule just as in the brain than to exist just in the brain; along these lines, something that exists just in the psyche isn't ‘that than which nothing more noteworthy can be conceived’; hence, God exists truly too. Anselm likewise puts this another way: we can think about a being that can't be considered not to exist; such a being is more noteworthy than one that can be imagined not to exist; along these lines the best possible being can't be considered not to exist; consequently, the best possible being exists. This contention seems to infer that something looking like the conventional mystical God exists †in contrast to the cosmological and teleological contentions, which appear to be confined to a maker and a planner separately. This contention was quickly scrutinized by Gaunilo, who contended that equal thinking could be applied to demonstrate the presence of an ideal island. This is a decrease of Anselm’s position: it demonstrates it to have foolish outcomes. Notwithstanding, it isn't evident that there is a rational idea of the ideal island to begin with: what number of palm trees is the ideal number? Anselm’s own answer appears to recognize the ideal island †which is an ideal case of one sort of thing †from the ideal being †which is an ideal case of a thing, with no limitation to kind. It is no prudence, greatness, flawlessness of an island qua island that it exists, yet it is an ethicalness, greatness, flawlessness of a being that it exists, so the contention works just for the idea of an ideal being. The greater analysis is the one Kant imposed at Descartes’s adaptation of the contention, yet applies similarly to Anselm’s. It is that presence is certainly not an incredible creation nature of a being, on the grounds that it's anything but a nature of a being by any means; in Kant’s terms ‘existence is certifiably not a genuine predicate’.